


Verification, Synthesis, and Simulation

Brandon Bohrer

LFCPS

November 20, 2020

Does Anything Matter?



Can Model and Reality Get Along?

Hybrid Systems
Theorem Proving




```
velocity := *;  
?(velocityOk);  
{position' = ...}
```

Cyber Physical
System



Real CPS are Complex



¹<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140626152045-3625632-car-software-100m-lines-of-code-and-counting/>


We Can't Fix Everything



2



3



⁴ [WHM19]

²<https://weather.com/science/weather-explainers/news/black-ice-winter-weather-explainer>

³<https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/>

⁴<https://newsroom.intel.com/editorials/autonomous-cars-arent-dangerous-humans/>

But We Can Fix a Lot


- Catch bad control choices, replace them with good ones
- Catch bad physical models during testing
- Ensure correct compilation from models to code

But We Can Fix a Lot


- Catch bad control choices, replace them with good ones
- Catch bad physical models during testing
- Ensure correct compilation from models to code

Learning Objectives: Learn how to validate models experimentally, learn to build useful simulations


VeriPhy Connects the Ends



Outline: Each Step Preserves Safety



Example: 1D Car




Never exceed destination

safe \equiv (init $\rightarrow [\alpha]d \geq 0$)

$$\alpha \equiv \left(\overbrace{\left(v := *; ?d \geq \epsilon v \wedge 0 \leq v \leq V \right)}^{\text{control}}; t := 0; \right. \\ \left. \overbrace{\left(\{d' = -v, t' = 1 \ \& \ t \leq \epsilon\} @ \text{inv}(0 \leq t \leq \epsilon \wedge d \geq (\epsilon - t) \cdot v) \right)}^{\text{physics}} \right)^*$$

Example: 1D Car



Never exceed destination

safe \equiv (init \rightarrow $[\alpha]d \geq 0$)

Velocity chosen

Far Enough?


Velocity Envelope

$\alpha \equiv ((v := *; ?d \geq \epsilon v \wedge 0 \leq v \leq V); t := 0;$

physics

$\{d' = -v, t' = 1 \& t \leq \epsilon\} @ \text{inv}(0 \leq t \leq \epsilon \wedge d \geq (\epsilon - t) \cdot v)$)^{*}

Example: 1D Car



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
$$\left. \{d' = -v, t' = 1 \& t \leq \epsilon\} @ \text{inv}(0 \leq t \leq \epsilon \wedge d \geq (\epsilon - t) \cdot v) \right)^*$$

Physics

Constraint

Repeat

Example: 1D Car



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$$\text{safe} \equiv (\text{init} \rightarrow [\alpha]d \geq 0)$$

Velocity chosen

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physics

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Physics

Constraint

Invariant

Repeat

Sandbox Makes Control Total

- **Controller model** trusts implementation to choose safe velocity v .
- Sandbox $\text{total}(\text{ctrl})$ uses **fallback** if v unsafe.
- **Fallback** changes execution but not denotation!
 $(\llbracket \text{control} \cup \text{fallback} \rrbracket = \llbracket \text{control} \rrbracket)$


$$\omega \in \underbrace{\llbracket [(\text{ctrl}; \text{phys})^*] \psi \rrbracket}_{d\mathcal{L}(\mathbb{R})}$$

$$\Downarrow$$

$$\omega \in \underbrace{\llbracket [(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{phys})^*] \psi \rrbracket}_{d\mathcal{L}(\mathbb{R})}$$

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$$v := *; ?d \geq \epsilon v \wedge 0 \leq v \leq V$$

$$v := *; \rightsquigarrow ?d \geq \epsilon v \wedge 0 \leq v \leq V \cup \overbrace{v := 0}^{\text{fallback}}$$

Sandbox Makes Control Total

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
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$$v := *; ?d \geq \epsilon v \wedge 0 \leq v \leq V$$

$$\rightsquigarrow v := *; ?d \geq \epsilon v \wedge 0 \leq v \leq V \cup \overbrace{v := 0}^{\text{fallback}}$$

total(ctrl)

Invariants Make ODEs Go

- Differential equations are hard to compute
- Exact solutions are not met by real sensors
- **Invariants** are computable, monitorable, safe


$$\omega \in \underbrace{\llbracket [(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{phys})^*] \psi \rrbracket}_{d\mathcal{L}(\mathbb{R})}$$

$$\Downarrow$$

$$\omega \in \underbrace{\llbracket [(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{mon}(\text{phys}))^*] \psi \rrbracket}_{d\mathcal{L}(\mathbb{R})}$$

$$\alpha \equiv \left(\overbrace{(v := *; ?d \geq \varepsilon v \wedge 0 \leq v \leq V)}^{\text{control}}; t := 0; \right.$$

$$\left. \overbrace{\{d' = -v, t' = 1 \& t \leq \varepsilon\} @ \text{inv}(0 \leq t \leq \varepsilon \wedge d \geq (\varepsilon - t) \cdot v)}^{\text{physics}} \right)^*$$



$$d' = -v, t' = 1 \& t \leq \varepsilon$$

$$\rightsquigarrow d := *; t := *; ?0 \leq t \leq \varepsilon \wedge d \geq (\varepsilon - t) \cdot v;$$

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
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$$\left. \overbrace{\{d' = -v, t' = 1 \& t \leq \epsilon\} @ \text{inv}(0 \leq t \leq \epsilon \wedge d \geq (\epsilon - t) \cdot v)}^{\text{physics}} \right)^*$$



Sense
State

$$d' = -v, t' = 1 \& t \leq \epsilon$$

Test
invariant

$$\rightsquigarrow d := *; t := *; ?0 \leq t \leq \epsilon \wedge d \geq (\epsilon - t) \cdot v;$$

discrete(physics)

Sandbox Now Verified

```
(( ( v := *; ?ctrlMon(d, t, v, d+, t+, v+);  
  ∪ v := 0; )  
 t := 0;  
 d := *; t := *; ?(0 ≤ t ≤ ε ∧ d ≥ v(ε - t)); )*
```

Intervals Make Real Numbers Rational



Example: Compare π and e , soundly.

Solution: Conservative interval approximation

Example

Let $\nu_l = \{pi_1 \mapsto [3, 4], \quad e_1 \mapsto [2, 3],$
 $pi_{0.1} \mapsto [3.1, 3.2], e_{0.1} \mapsto [2.7, 2.8]\}$, then

- $\nu_l[(pi_1 \geq e_1)]$ is true (\top)



Intervals Make Real Numbers Rational


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
Example

Let $\nu_I = \{pi_1 \mapsto [3, 4], \quad e_1 \mapsto [2, 3],$
 $pi_{0.1} \mapsto [3.1, 3.2], e_{0.1} \mapsto [2.7, 2.8]\}$, then

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- $\nu_I[(pi_1 \geq e_1 + 1)]$ is ???



Intervals Make Real Numbers Rational


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
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 $pi_{0.1} \mapsto [3.1, 3.2], e_{0.1} \mapsto [2.7, 2.8]\}$, then

- $\nu_I \llbracket pi_1 \geq e_1 \rrbracket$ is true (\top)



- $\nu_I \llbracket pi_1 \geq e_1 + 1 \rrbracket$ is a *known unknown* (U)



Intervals Make Real Numbers Rational


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Example

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
- $\nu_I[(pi_1 \geq e_1)]$ is true (\top)



- $\nu_I[(pi_1 \geq e_1 + 1)]$ is a *known unknown* (U)



- $\nu_I[(pi_{0.1} \geq e_{0.1} + 1)]$ is false (\perp)



Intervals Make Real Numbers Rational


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
- $\nu_I[(pi_1 \geq e_1)]$ is true (\top)



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- $\nu_I[(pi_{0.1} \geq e_{0.1} + 1)]$ is false (\perp)



When truth values can be unknown, formulas are *3-valued*

d \mathcal{L} Has Interval Semantics

$$\omega_I[\theta_1 + \theta_2] = [l_1 + l_2, u_1 + u_2] \text{ where } \omega_I[\theta_i] = [l_i, u_i]$$

\wedge	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\top	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\mathbf{U}	\mathbf{U}	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp

\vee	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\top	\top	\top	\top
\mathbf{U}	\top	\mathbf{U}	\mathbf{U}
\perp	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp

$$\omega_I[\theta_1 < \theta_2] = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \omega_I[\theta_i] = (l_i, u_i) \text{ and } u_1 < l_2 \\ \perp & \text{if } \omega_I[\theta_i] = (l_i, u_i) \text{ and } l_1 \geq u_2 \\ \mathbf{U} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$(\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \llbracket ?\phi \rrbracket \text{ iff } \omega_I[\alpha] = \top$$

$$(\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \llbracket \alpha \cup \beta \rrbracket \text{ iff } (\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \text{ or } (\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \llbracket \beta \rrbracket$$

$$(\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \llbracket x := \theta \rrbracket \text{ iff } \nu_I = \omega_I[x \mapsto \omega_I[\theta]]$$

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Value of term
 θ is an interval

\wedge	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\top	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\mathbf{U}	\mathbf{U}	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp

\vee	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp
\top	\top	\top	\top
\mathbf{U}	\top	\mathbf{U}	\mathbf{U}
\perp	\top	\mathbf{U}	\perp

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Value of term
 θ is an interval

\wedge	\top	U	\perp
\top	\top	U	\perp
U	U	U	\perp
\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp

\vee	\top	U	\perp
\top	\top	\top	\top
U	\top	U	U
\perp	\top	U	\perp

3-valued truth tables
for propositional ϕ

$$\omega_I[\theta_1 < \theta_2] = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \omega_I[\theta_i] = (l_i, u_i) \text{ and } u_1 < l_2 \\ \perp & \text{if } \omega_I[\theta_i] = (l_i, u_i) \text{ and } l_1 \geq u_2 \\ \text{U} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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Value of term
 θ is an interval

\wedge	\top	U	\perp
\top	\top	U	\perp
U	U	U	\perp
\perp	\perp	\perp	\perp

\vee	\top	U	\perp
\top	\top	\top	\top
U	\top	U	U
\perp	\top	U	\perp

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Condition must
be true \top

Initial and
final state

$$(\omega_I, \omega_I) \in \llbracket ?\phi \rrbracket \text{ iff } \omega_I[\alpha] = \top$$


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Interval Semantics Refines Real Semantics

Theorem (Interval Semantics Refines Real Semantics)

- Assume $\omega \in \omega_I$ (Interval contains real state)
- Assume $(\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket$ (Interval program transitions)
- Then exists $\nu \in \nu_I$ such that $(\omega, \nu) \in \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket$ (New interval contains real state)



Sandbox HP Already Verified

```
(( ( v := *; ?ctrlMon(d, t, v, d+, t+, v+);  
  ∪ v := 0; )  
 t := 0;  
 d := *; t := *; ?(0 ≤ t ≤ ε ∧ d ≥ v(ε - t)); )*
```

Verified CakeML Source is Generated

CakeML source incorporates FFIs with control, actuation, sensing

```
fun cmlSandboxBody state =  
  if not (stop ()) then  
    state.ctrlNew := extCtrl state;  
    state.ctrl := if intervalSem ctrlMon state =  $\top$   
                  then state.ctrlNew  
                  else fallback state;  
    actuate state.ctrl;  
    state.sensors := sense ();  
    if intervalSem plantMon state =  $\top$  then  
      Runtime.fullGC ();  
      cmlSandboxBody state  
    else violation "Plant Violation"
```


CakeML Sandbox is Sound

Theorem (Soundness for CakeML Sandbox, Main Case)


If $(\llbracket \omega \rrbracket, \llbracket \nu \rrbracket) \in \llbracket \text{cmlSandbox} \rrbracket$ then $(\llbracket \omega \rrbracket, \llbracket \nu \rrbracket) \in \llbracket \text{sandbox} \rrbracket$

$$\begin{array}{c} (\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \underbrace{\llbracket (\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{mon}(\text{phys}))^* \rrbracket}_{\text{dL } (\mathbb{Q}^2)} \\ \uparrow \\ (\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \underbrace{\{\text{EXE}(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}), \text{mon}(\text{phys}))^*\}}_{\text{ARM or x64}} \end{array}$$

CakeML Compiler Preserves Guarantees





End-to-end Proof Meets in Middle



1D Evaluated in Hardware and Simulation

Sandbox Catches Bad Controller
Sandbox Catches Bad Obstacles



Control Fault C_f , Plant Fault P_f , Control Spike C_t , Obstacle Motion Ob

Simulation

Hardware

Let's look at 1D code

Reminder: Interface

Table: External functions and their intended meaning

External func.	Intended Meaning
<code>ffiConst</code>	Get the values of system constants
<code>ffiSense</code>	Get the current sensor readings
<code>ffiExtCtrl</code>	Get the next (untrusted) control decision
<code>ffiActuate</code>	Actuate a control decision
<code>ffiStop</code>	Check whether to run more control cycles
<code>ffiViolation</code>	Exit control loop due to a fatal violation

What about 2D?

Hybrid Systems
Theorem Proving




```
velocity := *;  
?(velocityOk);  
{position' = ...}
```

Cyber Physical
System




Waypoint Model Makes 2D Possible


Hybrid Systems
Theorem Proving






```
velocity := *;  
?(velocityOk);  
{position' = ...}
```



Cyber Physical System




AirSim Environments



PD Controllers Control Car

- *Feedback control* chooses control value (steering) based on difference between current state and desired *velocity setpoint*
- *Proportional* term considers distance Δx to pathway with proportion c_x
- *Derivative* term considers derivative (orientation) *dir* with proportion c_{dir}

$$\text{steer} = \Delta x \cdot c_x + \text{dir} \cdot c_{dir}$$



5

⁵https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Settling_time

Evaluation

World	Avg. Speed (m/s)				
	BB	PD1	PD2	PD3	Human
Rect	4.3	6.32	7.16	12.6	9.92
Turns	3.78	3.95	4.43	4.69	9.66
Clover	X	29.5	29.5	29.5	28.9
World	Ctrl Fail.				
	BB	PD1	PD2	PD3	Human
Rect	0.5%	0.1%	0.1%	0.19%	1.14%
Turns	1.0%	1.0%	1.1%	4.7%	3.61%
Clover	X	0.2%	0.2%	0.19%	0.29%
World	Plant Fail.				
	BB	PD1	PD2	PD3	Human
Rect	36.8%	8.23%	8.5%	14%	41.3%
Turns	18.6%	3.95%	6.8%	11%	21.1%
Clover	X	66%	66%	66%	48%

Let's look at 2D code


Conclusion

- We know to model idealized CPS, ready to go further
- Sandboxes + compilation bridge correct models to correct implementation
- Simulation + Experiments also validate model
- Simulations should be independent from model

References I

-  Benjamin Wilson, Judy Hoffman, and Jamie Morgenstern, *Predictive inequity in object detection*, CoRR **abs/1902.11097** (2019).

Game Models Driving




$$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$$

$$\text{input} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh] := *; k := *; ?\text{Feas}$$

$$\text{ctrl} \equiv (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$$

$$\text{physics} \equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{k} \right), y' = vk (-x), \\ \& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$$

Game Models Driving



Loop


$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$

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$\text{physics} \equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{k} \right), y' = vk (-x),$
 $\& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$

Game Models Driving



Read value

$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$

Loop



$\text{input} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh] := *; k := *; ?\text{Feas}$

Assume test

$\text{ctrl} \equiv (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$

$\text{physics} \equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{k} \right), y' = vk (-x),$
 $\& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$

Game Models Driving



Read value

$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$

Loop

$\text{input} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh];$



Assume test

$\text{ctrl} \equiv (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$

Switch players: Write value, assert test

$\text{physics} \equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{k}\right), y' = vk(-x),$
 $\& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$

Game Models Driving



Read value

$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$

Loop

input $\equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh]$

Assume test



ctrl $\equiv (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$

Switch players: Write value, assert test

Init timer

physics $\equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{k}\right), y' = vk(-x),$
 $\& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$

Game Models Driving



Read value

$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$

Loop

input $\equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh];$

Assume test

ctrl $\equiv (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$

Switch players: Write value, assert test



physics $\equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{k}\right), y' = vk (-x),$

Init timer

$\& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$

Evolve physics

Game Models Driving



Read value

$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$

Loop

$\text{input} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh];$

Assume test

$\text{ctrl} \equiv (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$

Switch players: Write value, assert test

$\text{physics} \equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{t}\right), y' = vk (-x),$



Init timer

$\& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$

Constraint

Evolve physics

Game Models Driving



Read value

$\alpha^* \equiv (\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*$

Loop

$\text{input} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh]$

Assume test

$\text{ctrl} \equiv (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$

Switch players: Write value, assert test

$\text{physics} \equiv t := 0; \{t' = 1, v' = a, x' = vk \left(y - \frac{1}{t}\right), y' = vk(-x),$

Init timer

$\& t \leq T \wedge v \geq 0\}$

Constraint

Evolve physics

$\text{Ann} \wedge x > 0 \wedge 0 \leq vl < vh \wedge \max(A, B) \leq v \leq \min(A, B)$

$\text{Feas} \equiv -B \leq a \leq A$

Goals are Safety and Liveness

$\text{safe} \equiv \text{Inv} \wedge (\|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \rightarrow v \in [vl, vh])$

$\text{prog} \equiv \|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \wedge v \in [vl, vh]$

$\text{Safe} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*] \text{safe}$

$\text{Live} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics}^d))^\times] \text{prog}$

Goals are Safety and Liveness

They move first

$\text{safe} \equiv \text{Inv} \wedge (\|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \rightarrow v \in [vl, vh])$

$\text{prog} \equiv \|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \wedge v \in [vl, vh]$

$\text{Safe} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*] \text{safe}$

$\text{Live} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics}^d))^\times] \text{prog}$

Goals are Safety and Liveness

$\text{safe} \equiv \text{Inv} \wedge (\|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \rightarrow v \in [vl, vh])$

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$\text{Safe} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*] \text{safe}$

$\text{Live} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics}^d))^{\times}] \text{prog}$

They move first

They control loop

Goals are Safety and Liveness

$\text{safe} \equiv \text{Inv} \wedge (\|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \rightarrow v \in [vl, vh])$

$\text{prog} \equiv \|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \wedge v \in [vl, vh]$

$\text{Safe} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*] \text{safe}$

$\text{Live} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics}^d))^{\times}] \text{prog}$

They move first

They control loop

I control loop

Goals are Safety and Liveness

$\text{safe} \equiv \text{Inv} \wedge (\|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \rightarrow v \in [vl, vh])$

$\text{prog} \equiv \|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \wedge v \in [vl, vh]$

$\text{Safe} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*] \text{safe}$

$\text{Live} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics}^d))^{\times}] \text{prog}$

They move first

They control loop

I control loop

I control duration

Goals are Safety and Liveness

$\text{safe} \equiv \text{Inv} \wedge (\|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \rightarrow v \in [vl, vh])$

$\text{prog} \equiv \|(x, y)\| \leq \epsilon \wedge v \in [vl, vh]$

$\text{Safe} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*] \text{safe}$

$\text{Live} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics}^d))^{\times}] \text{prog}$

$\text{Win} \equiv [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics}^d); ?\text{safe})^{\times}] \text{prog}$

They move first


They control loop

I control loop

I control duration

① Proving and Synthesis

Tooling Implements Verified Bridge



Each Step is a Refinement

$$\omega \in \llbracket [(\text{ctrl}; \text{physics})^*] \psi \rrbracket$$

\Downarrow

$$\omega \in \llbracket [(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{physics})^*] \psi \rrbracket$$

\Downarrow

$$\omega \in \llbracket [(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{discrete}(\text{physics}))^*] \psi \rrbracket$$

$$\Rightarrow \nu \in \llbracket \psi \rrbracket$$

$$(\omega, \nu) \in \llbracket [(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{discrete}(\text{physics}))^*] \rrbracket$$

\Uparrow

$$(\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \llbracket [(\text{total}(\text{ctrl}); \text{discrete}(\text{physics}))^*] \rrbracket$$

\Uparrow

$$(\omega_I, \nu_I) \in \{\text{Compile}((\text{total}(\text{ctrl}), \text{discrete}(\text{physics}))^*)\}$$

Real arithmetic, hybrid,
trusted control

Real arithmetic, hybrid,
untrusted control

Real arithmetic, discrete,
untrusted control

Real arithmetic, discrete,
untrusted control

Interval arith., discrete,
untrusted control

Interval word arithmetic,
machine-executable

Proof Consists of Refinement and Safety

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \dots \qquad \qquad \qquad \dots \\
 \frac{}{\text{inv}(d), \text{Feas} \rightarrow \text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq [] \text{ctrl}} \leq I \text{ rules} \qquad \frac{}{\text{inv}(d), \text{Feas} \rightarrow [\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}}][\text{physics}] \text{inv}} [\cdot] \text{ rules} \\
 \hline
 \text{inv}(d), \text{Feas} \rightarrow [\text{ctrl}][(\text{physics})^d] \text{inv}(d - \Delta d) \leq E \\
 \hline
 \text{inv}(d), \text{Feas} \rightarrow [\text{ctrl}; (\text{physics})^d] \text{inv}(d - \Delta d) [;] \\
 \hline
 \text{inv}(d) \rightarrow [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics})^d)] \text{inv}(d - \Delta d) [;], [; *], [?] \\
 \hline
 [(\text{input}; \text{ctrl}; (\text{physics})^d)^\times] \text{goal} [\times]
 \end{array}$$

Invariants Inform Controller Design

$$\text{Inv} \equiv v \geq 0 \wedge \text{IsCircle} \wedge \text{Ann} \wedge \text{BoundV} \\ \wedge \text{BoundXY}(v, v_h, B) \wedge \text{BoundXY}(v_l, v, A)$$

$$\text{IsCircle} \equiv \varepsilon \leq \frac{1}{|k|}$$

$$\cap_{\text{circ}} \equiv k(x^2 + y^2) - 2x$$

$$\text{Ann} \equiv |\cap_{\text{circ}} - k\varepsilon^2| \leq 2\varepsilon$$

$$\text{BoundV} \equiv 0 \leq v_l < v_h \wedge \max(A, B)T \leq v_h - v_l$$

$$\text{BoundXY}(v_1, v_2, \text{acc}) \equiv v_1 \leq v_2$$

$$\vee (1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \frac{v_1^2 - v_2^2}{2a} \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty$$

Proofs Propose Control Strategies

- Refine high-level control spec. to low-level spec: $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq \text{ctrl}$

input; $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh] := *; k := *; ?\text{Feas}; a := *; ?\text{Go}$

$\text{Go} \equiv \text{Feas} \wedge v + aT \geq 0$

$\wedge \left(v \leq vh \wedge v + aT \leq vh \vee \right.$

$\left. (1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{(v+aT)^2 - vh^2}{2B} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty \right)$

$\wedge \left(vl \leq v \wedge vl \leq v + aT \vee \right.$

$\left. (1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{vl^2 - (v+aT)^2}{2A} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty \right)$

Proofs Propose Control Strategies

- Refine high-level control spec. to low-level spec: $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq \text{ctrl}$

input; $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh] := *; k \dots 2\epsilon \dots 2\epsilon$

Go $\equiv \text{Feas} \wedge v + aT \geq 0$

Don't go backward

$\wedge (v \leq vh \wedge v + aT \leq vh \vee$

$(1 + |k|\epsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{(v+aT)^2 - vh^2}{2B} \right) + \epsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty$

$\wedge (vl \leq v \wedge vl \leq v + aT \vee$

$(1 + |k|\epsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{vl^2 - (v+aT)^2}{2A} \right) + \epsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty$

Proofs Propose Control Strategies

- Refine high-level control spec. to low-level spec: $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq \text{ctrl}$

input; $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh] := *; k \dots$

Go $\equiv \text{Feas} \wedge v + aT \geq 0$

Don't go backward

High bound

$\wedge (v \leq vh \wedge v + aT \leq vh \vee$

$$(1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{(v+aT)^2 - vh^2}{2B} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_{\infty}$$

$\wedge (vl \leq v \wedge vl \leq v + aT \vee$

$$(1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{vl^2 - (v+aT)^2}{2A} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_{\infty}$$

Proofs Propose Control Strategies

- Refine high-level control spec. to low-level spec: $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq \text{ctrl}$

input; $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \equiv (x, y) := *; [v_l, v_h] := *; k \leq \frac{2\epsilon}{aT} \wedge \text{Go}$

Go $\equiv \text{Feas} \wedge v + aT \geq 0$

Don't go backward

High bound

$\wedge (v \leq v_h \wedge v + aT \leq v_h \vee$

$$(1 + |k|\epsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{(v+aT)^2 - v_h^2}{2B} \right) + \epsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty$$

Low bound

$\wedge (v_l \leq v \wedge v_l \leq v + aT \vee$

$$(1 + |k|\epsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{v_l^2 - (v+aT)^2}{2A} \right) + \epsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty$$

Proofs Propose Control Strategies

- Refine high-level control spec. to low-level spec: $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq \text{ctrl}$

input; $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \equiv (x, y) := *; [v_l, v_h] := *; k \dots$

Go $\equiv \text{Feas} \wedge v + aT \geq 0$

Don't go backward

High bound

$\wedge (v \leq v_h \wedge v + aT \leq v_h \vee$

Limit already met

$$(1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{(v+aT) - v_h}{2B} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty$$

Low bound

$\wedge (v_l \leq v \wedge v_l \leq v + aT \vee$

$$(1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{v_l^2 - (v+aT)^2}{2A} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_\infty$$

Proofs Propose Control Strategies

- Refine high-level control spec. to low-level spec: $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq \text{ctrl}$

input; $\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \equiv (x, y) := *; [vl, vh] := *; k \dots$

Go $\equiv \text{Feas} \wedge v + aT \geq 0$

Don't go backward

High bound

$\wedge (v \leq vh \wedge v + aT \leq vh \vee$

Limit already met

$$(1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{(v+aT) - vh}{2B} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_{\infty}$$

Low bound

$\wedge (vl \leq v \wedge vl \leq v + aT \vee$

Endzone not reached

$$(1 + |k|\varepsilon)^2 \left(vT + \frac{a}{2}T^2 + \frac{vl^2 - (v+aT)^2}{2A} \right) + \varepsilon \leq \|(x, y)\|_{\infty}$$

System Controller Refines Game Model

*	
$\Gamma \rightarrow (\text{Go}_a^{\text{accTerm}}) \wedge (\text{Go} \rightarrow \text{Feas})_a^{a'}$	\mathbb{R}
$\Gamma \rightarrow (\exists a \text{Go}) \wedge (\forall a (\text{Go} \rightarrow \text{Feas}))$	$\exists I, \forall I$
$\Gamma \rightarrow (a := *; ?\text{Go}) \leq_{[]} (a := *; ?\text{Feas})^d$	$[:*^d]$
$\Gamma \rightarrow \text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}} \leq_{[]} \text{ctrl}$	def.

Refined System is Safe

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \dots \qquad \qquad \qquad \dots \\
 \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow [\text{ctrl};] \text{lemma}}{\Gamma \rightarrow [\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}}][(\text{physics})^d] \text{inv}(d - \Delta d)} \quad \forall E, \mathbb{R} \qquad \frac{\text{lemma} \rightarrow [(\text{physics})^d] \text{inv}(d - \Delta d)}{M[\cdot]} \text{ ODE safety} \\
 \hline
 \Gamma \rightarrow [\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}}][(\text{physics})^d] \text{inv}(d - \Delta d) \\
 \hline
 \Gamma \rightarrow [\text{ctrl}_{\text{sys}}; (\text{physics})^d] \text{inv}(d - \Delta d) \quad [;]
 \end{array}$$