

Lecture Notes on Proofs as Programs

15-317: Constructive Logic
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1 Introduction

In this lecture we directly exploit the constructive nature of proofs in constructive logic. We investigate a computational interpretation of constructive proofs and relate it to functional programming. On the propositional fragment of logic this is called the Curry-Howard isomorphism [How80]. From the very outset of the development of constructive logic and mathematics, a central idea has been that *proofs ought to represent constructions*. The Curry-Howard isomorphism is only a particularly poignant and beautiful realization of this idea. In a highly influential subsequent paper, Per Martin-Löf [ML80] developed it further into a more expressive calculus called *type theory*.

2 Propositions as Types

In order to illustrate the relationship between proofs and programs we introduce a new judgment:

$$M : A \quad M \text{ is a proof term for proposition } A$$

We presuppose that A is a proposition when we write this judgment. We will also interpret $M : A$ as “ M is a program of type A ”. These dual interpretations of the same judgment are the core of the Curry-Howard isomorphism. We either think of M as a syntactic term that represents the proof of

A true, or we think of A as the type of the program M . As we discuss each connective, we give both readings of the rules to emphasize the analogy.

The judgments A true and $M : A$ should be interrelated. We intend that if $M : A$ then A true. That is the proof term calculus is *sound* with respect to the *true* judgment, because $M : A$ only if also A true. Conversely, if A true, then $M : A$ for some appropriate proof term M . But we want something more: every deduction of $M : A$ should directly correspond to a deduction of A true with an *identical structure* and vice versa. In order to make that happen we use the same inference rules of natural deduction but annotate them with (unique) proof terms. The property above should then be obvious. Since proof terms uniquely identify which proof rule needs to be used to prove them, the proof term M of $M : A$ will correspond directly to the corresponding proof of A true.

Conjunction. Constructively, we think of a proof of $A \wedge B$ true as a pair of proofs: one for A true and one for B true. So if M is a proof of A and N is a proof of B , then the pair $\langle M, N \rangle$ of proofs is a proof of $A \wedge B$.

$$\frac{M : A \quad N : B}{\langle M, N \rangle : A \wedge B} \wedge I$$

The elimination rules correspond to the projections from a pair to its first and second elements to get the individual proofs of A and of B , respectively, back out from a pair M that is a proof of $A \wedge B$.

$$\frac{M : A \wedge B}{\mathbf{fst} M : A} \wedge E_1 \qquad \frac{M : A \wedge B}{\mathbf{snd} M : B} \wedge E_2$$

Hence the conjunction proposition $A \wedge B$ corresponds to the product type $A \times B$. And, indeed, product types in functional programming languages have the same property that conjunction propositions $A \wedge B$ have. Constructing a pair $\langle M, N \rangle$ of type $A \times B$ requires a program M of type A and a program N of type B (as in $\wedge I$). Given a pair M of type $A \times B$, its first component of type A can be retrieved by the projection $\mathbf{fst} M$ (as in $\wedge E_1$), its second component of type B by the projection $\mathbf{snd} M$ (as in $\wedge E_2$).

Truth. Constructively, we think of a proof of \top true as a unit element that carries no information.

$$\frac{}{\langle \rangle : \top} \top I$$

Hence \top corresponds to the unit type **1** with one element. There is no elimination rule and hence no further proof term constructs for truth. Indeed, we have not put any information into $\langle \rangle$ when constructing it via $\top I$, so cannot expect to get any information back out when trying to eliminate it. Dually, no information can be read off from the only element of type **1**.

Implication. Constructively, we think of a proof of implication $A \supset B$ *true* as a *function* which transforms a proof of A *true* into a proof of B *true*.

In mathematics and many programming languages, we define a function f of a variable x by writing $f(x) = \dots$ where the right-hand side “ \dots ” depends on x . For example, we might write $f(x) = x^2 + x - 1$. In functional programming, we can instead write $f = \lambda x. x^2 + x - 1$, that is, we explicitly form a functional object by λ -*abstraction* of a variable (x , in the example).

In the concrete syntax of our Standard ML-like programming language, $\lambda x. M$ is written as `fn x => M`. We will try to mostly use the concrete SML syntax, but we may slip up occasionally and write the λ -notation instead.

Since the constructive proof of $A \supset B$ *true* is a function, we now use the notation of λ -abstraction to annotate the rule of implication introduction with proof terms. In the official syntax, we label the abstraction with a proposition (writing $\lambda u:A$ or `fn x:A`, respectively) in order to specify the domain of a function unambiguously. In practice we will often omit the proposition label to make expressions shorter—usually (but not always!) it can be determined from the context.

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\dots}{u : A} \quad u}{\vdots} \quad M : B}{\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M : A \supset B} \supset I^u$$

The hypothesis label u acts as a variable, and any use of the hypothesis labeled u in the proof of B corresponds to an occurrence of u in proof term M . Notice how a constructive proof of B *true* from the additional assumption A *true* to establish $A \supset B$ *true* also describes the transformation of a proof of A *true* to a proof of B *true*. But the proof term `fn u => M` explicitly represents this transformation syntactically as a function, instead of leaving this construction implicit by inspection of whatever the proof does.

As a concrete example, consider the (trivial) proof of $A \supset A$ *true*:

$$\frac{\frac{\dots}{A \text{ true}} \quad u}{A \supset A \text{ true}} \supset I^u$$

If we annotate the deduction with proof terms, we obtain

$$\frac{\overline{u} \quad u}{u : A} \supset I^u$$

So our proof corresponds to the identity function id at type A which simply returns its argument. It can be defined as $\text{id}(u) = u$ or as $\text{id} = (\text{fn } u \Rightarrow u)$.

Constructively, a proof of $A \supset B$ *true* is a function transforming a proof of A *true* to a proof of B *true*. Using $A \supset B$ *true* by its elimination rule $\supset E$, thus, corresponds to providing the proof of A *true* that $A \supset B$ *true* is waiting for to obtain a proof of B *true*. The rule for implication elimination corresponds to function application. Following the convention in functional programming, we write $M N$ for the application of the function M to argument N , rather than the more verbose $M(N)$ with parentheses.

$$\frac{M : A \supset B \quad N : A}{M N : B} \supset E$$

What is the meaning of $A \supset B$ as a type? From the discussion above it should be clear that it can be interpreted as a function type $A \rightarrow B$. The introduction and elimination rules for implication can also be viewed as formation rules for functional abstraction $\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M$ and function application $M N$. Forming a functional abstraction $\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M$ corresponds to a function that accepts input parameter u of type A and produces M of type B (as in $\supset I$). Using a function $M : A \rightarrow B$ corresponds to applying it to a concrete input argument N of type A to obtain an output $M N$ of type B .

Note that we obtain the usual introduction and elimination rules for implication if we erase the proof terms. This will continue to be true for all rules in the remainder of this section and is immediate evidence for the soundness of the proof term calculus, that is, if $M : A$ then A *true*.

As a second example we consider a proof of $(A \wedge B) \supset (B \wedge A)$ *true*.

$$\frac{\frac{\overline{u} \quad u}{A \wedge B \text{ true}} \wedge E_2 \quad \frac{\overline{u} \quad u}{A \wedge B \text{ true}} \wedge E_1}{\frac{B \text{ true} \quad A \text{ true}}{B \wedge A \text{ true}} \wedge I} \supset I^u$$

When we annotate this derivation with proof terms, we obtain the swap

function which takes a pair $\langle M, N \rangle$ and returns the reverse pair $\langle N, M \rangle$.

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{}{u : A \wedge B} u}{\mathbf{snd} u : B} \wedge E_2 \quad \frac{\frac{}{u : A \wedge B} u}{\mathbf{fst} u : A} \wedge E_1}{\langle \mathbf{snd} u, \mathbf{fst} u \rangle : B \wedge A} \wedge I}{(\mathbf{fn} u \Rightarrow \langle \mathbf{snd} u, \mathbf{fst} u \rangle) : (A \wedge B) \supset (B \wedge A)} \supset I^u$$

Disjunction. Constructively, we think of a proof of $A \vee B$ *true* as either a proof of A *true* or a proof of B *true*. Disjunction therefore corresponds to a disjoint sum type $A + B$ that either store something of type A or something of type B . The two introduction rules correspond to the left and right injection into a sum type.

$$\frac{M : A}{\mathbf{inl} M : A \vee B} \vee I_1 \quad \frac{N : B}{\mathbf{inr} N : A \vee B} \vee I_2$$

In the official syntax, we annotate the injections \mathbf{inl}_B and \mathbf{inr}_A with propositions B and A , so that a (valid) proof term has an unambiguous type. In writing actual programs we usually omit this annotation.

When using a disjunction $A \vee B$ *true* in a proof, we need to be prepared to handle A *true* as well as B *true*, because we don't know whether $\vee I_1$ or $\vee I_2$ was used to prove it. The elimination rule corresponds to a case construct discriminating between a left and right injection into a sum type.

$$\frac{\frac{M : A \vee B \quad \frac{\frac{}{u : A} u}{\vdots} \quad \frac{\frac{}{w : B} w}{\vdots} \quad O : C}{\mathbf{case} M \mathbf{of} \mathbf{inl} u \Rightarrow N \mid \mathbf{inr} w \Rightarrow O : C} \vee E^{u,w}}$$

Recall that, importantly, the hypothesis labeled u is available *only* in the proof of the second premise and the hypothesis labeled w only in the proof of the third premise. This means that the scope of the variable u is N , while the scope of the variable w is O . Computationally, different programs N and O with different local variables u and w , respectively, are used depending on the injection that M used to construct something of type $A + B$, but both N and O have to produce an output of common type C in either case.

Falsehood. There is no introduction rule for falsehood (\perp). We can therefore view it as the empty type $\mathbf{0}$. The corresponding elimination rule allows

a term of \perp to stand for an expression of any type when wrapped with **abort**. However, there is no computation rule for it, which means during computation of a valid program we will never try to evaluate a term of the form **abort** M .

$$\frac{M : \perp}{\mathbf{abort} M : C} \perp E$$

An annotation C as in **abort** _{C} M which disambiguates the type of **abort** M will often be omitted, because it can be read off from M .

Interaction Laws. This completes our assignment of proof terms to the logical inference rules. Now we can interpret logical interaction laws as programming exercises. Consider the following distributivity law:

$$(L11a) \quad (A \supset (B \wedge C)) \supset (A \supset B) \wedge (A \supset C) \text{ true}$$

Interpreted constructively, this assignment can be read as:

Write a function which, when given a function from A to pairs of type $B \wedge C$, returns two functions: one which maps A to B and one which maps A to C .

This is satisfied by the following function:

$$\mathbf{fn} u \Rightarrow \langle (\mathbf{fn} w \Rightarrow \mathbf{fst}(uw)), (\mathbf{fn} v \Rightarrow \mathbf{snd}(uv)) \rangle$$

The following deduction provides the evidence by directly following the proof term (using the rule belonging to the respective top-level proof term):

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\frac{u : A \supset (B \wedge C)}{u} \quad \frac{w : A}{w}}{uw : B \wedge C} \wedge E_1}{\mathbf{fst}(uw) : B} \supset E_1 \quad \frac{\frac{\frac{u : A \supset (B \wedge C)}{u} \quad \frac{v : A}{v}}{uv : B \wedge C} \wedge E_2}{\mathbf{snd}(uv) : C} \supset E_2}{\mathbf{fn} w \Rightarrow \mathbf{fst}(uw) : A \supset B} \supset I^w \quad \frac{\mathbf{fn} v \Rightarrow \mathbf{snd}(uv) : A \supset C}{} \supset I^v}{\langle (\mathbf{fn} w \Rightarrow \mathbf{fst}(uw)), (\mathbf{fn} v \Rightarrow \mathbf{snd}(uv)) \rangle : (A \supset B) \wedge (A \supset C)} \wedge I}{\mathbf{fn} u \Rightarrow \langle (\mathbf{fn} w \Rightarrow \mathbf{fst}(uw)), (\mathbf{fn} v \Rightarrow \mathbf{snd}(uv)) \rangle : (A \supset (B \wedge C)) \supset ((A \supset B) \wedge (A \supset C))} \supset I^u$$

Programs in constructive propositional logic work for any types (so A, B, C above) but are somewhat uninteresting in that they do not manipulate basic data types such as natural numbers, integers, lists, trees, etc. We introduce such data types later in this course, following the same method we have used in the development of logic.

Summary. To close this section we recall the *guiding principles behind the assignment of proof terms to deductions*.

1. *Soundness*: For every deduction of $M : A$ there is a deduction of A *true*
2. *Completeness*: For every deduction of A *true* there is a proof term M and deduction of $M : A$.
3. The correspondence between proof terms M and deductions of A *true* is a bijection. In particular, M uniquely characterizes the deduction.

Furthermore, the names of the proof terms are chosen to unambiguously identify the proof rule while also being a mnemonic reminder of the corresponding functional programming principle.

3 Reduction

In the preceding section, we have introduced the assignment of proof terms to natural deductions. If proofs are programs then we need to explain how proofs are executed, and which results may be returned by a computation.

We explain the operational interpretation of proofs in two steps. In the first step we introduce a judgment of *reduction* written $M \Longrightarrow_R M'$ and read " M reduces to M' ". In the second step, a computation then proceeds by a sequence of reductions $M \Longrightarrow_R M_1 \Longrightarrow_R M_2 \dots$, according to a fixed strategy, until we reach a value which cannot be reduced anymore and is the result of the computation. In this section we cover reduction; we may return to reduction strategies in a later lecture.

As in the development of propositional logic, we discuss each of the connectives separately, taking care to make sure the explanations are independent. This means we can consider various sublanguages and we can later extend our logic or programming language without invalidating the results from this section. Furthermore, it greatly simplifies the analysis of properties of the reduction rules.

In general, we think of the proof terms corresponding to the introduction rules as the *constructors* because they construct compound terms out of smaller terms. And we think of the proof terms corresponding to the elimination rules as the *destructors*, because they decompose proof terms into their pieces. With this perspective, it is insightful to investigate what happens when a destructor is applied to its corresponding constructor, because that decomposes a proof term that was just constructed with its corresponding constructor out of its constituent proof terms.

Conjunction. The constructor for conjunction $A \wedge B$ forms a pair $\langle M, N \rangle$, while the destructors are the left and right projections. Taking the first projection of a pair, so $\mathbf{fst} \langle M, N \rangle$, exactly results in the first element M . This is captured by reduction rules prescribing the actions of the projections:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{fst} \langle M, N \rangle &\Longrightarrow_R M \\ \mathbf{snd} \langle M, N \rangle &\Longrightarrow_R N \end{aligned}$$

Indeed, we can *justify* these reduction rules by investigating what the proof term proof rules do when constructing the proof term $\mathbf{fst} \langle M, N \rangle$. By uniqueness of proof terms, the only way to produce this proof term is by using elimination rule $\wedge E_1$ on the conclusion of the introduction rule $\wedge I$:

$$\frac{\frac{M : A \quad N : B}{\langle M, N \rangle : A \wedge B} \wedge I}{\mathbf{fst} \langle M, N \rangle : A} \wedge E_1 \Longrightarrow_R M : A$$

And, indeed, this derivation shows that there already is a simpler proof term as evidence for A *true* than the proof term of $\mathbf{fst} \langle M, N \rangle : A$ in the conclusion, namely the proof term A from the top left premise $M : A$. When read as programs with types, the fact that program $\mathbf{fst} \langle M, N \rangle$ has type C reduces to the fact that the simpler program M has type C . This is captured in the above reduction rule. These (computational) reduction rules will turn out to directly correspond to the proof term analogue of the logical reductions for the local soundness from the subsequent Harmony lecture.

Truth. The constructor for \top just forms the unit element, $\langle \rangle$. Since there is no destructor, there is no reduction rule that would reduce $\langle \rangle$ in any way.

Implication. The constructor for implication $A \supset B$ forms a function by λ -abstraction, while the destructor applies the function to an argument. In general, the application of a function to an argument is computed by *substitution*. As a simple example from mathematics, consider the following equivalent definitions

$$f(x) = x^2 + x - 1 \quad f = \text{fn } x \Rightarrow x^2 + x - 1$$

and the computation when plugging the value 2 in for argument x :

$$f(2) = (\text{fn } x \Rightarrow x^2 + x - 1)(2) = [2/x](x^2 + x - 1) = 2^2 + 2 - 1 = 5$$

In the second step, we substitute 2 for occurrences of x in $x^2 + x - 1$, the *body of the λ -expression*. We write $[2/x](x^2 + x - 1) = 2^2 + 2 - 1$.

In general, the notation for the substitution of N for occurrences of u in M is $[N/u]M$. Applying a λ -abstraction $\lambda x. M$ to an argument N reduces to substituting N for x in M . We therefore write the reduction rule as:

$$(\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M) N \Longrightarrow_R [N/u]M$$

We have to be somewhat careful so that substitution behaves correctly. In particular, **no** variable of N should be bound in M and **no** variable of M should be bound in N in order to avoid conflict. Neither should we continue substituting N for u within occurrences of yet another $\text{fn } u \Rightarrow O$ anywhere within M . We can always achieve this by renaming bound variables—an operation which clearly does not change the meaning of a proof term. Again, we can justify this reduction rule by investigating what the rules do for proof term $(\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M) N$. By uniqueness of proof terms, the only way to produce this proof term is by using elimination rule $\supset E$ (with a second compatible premise $N : A$) on the conclusion of the introduction rule $\supset I$:

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{u}{u : A} \quad \vdots \quad M : B}{\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M : A \supset B} \supset I^u \quad N : A}{(\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M) N : B} \supset E \Longrightarrow_R [N/u]M : B$$

Indeed, the result $[N/u]M$ of the reduction is a simpler proof term that provides the same evidence for N *true* (alias this program has type N) as the original proof term $(\text{fn } u \Rightarrow M) N$. Again, this computational reduction directly relates to the logical reduction from the local soundness of the Harmony lecture using the substitution notation for the right-hand side.

Disjunction. The constructors for $A \vee B$ inject into a sum type; the destructor distinguishes cases. Now the destructor can be applied to either of the two constructors **inl** M or **inr** M . If the constructor **inl** M from the left injunction is used, then a reduction to the left side of the destructor’s case distinction can be used, again using substitution (likewise for **inr** M):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{case inl } M \text{ of inl } u \Rightarrow N \mid \text{inr } w \Rightarrow O &\Longrightarrow_R [M/u]N \\ \text{case inr } M \text{ of inl } u \Rightarrow N \mid \text{inr } w \Rightarrow O &\Longrightarrow_R [M/w]O \end{aligned}$$

To justify the reductions, we consider the derivation of elimination rule applied to each introduction rule corresponding to the destructor applied to each constructor, for example:

$$\frac{\frac{M : A}{\mathbf{inl} M : A \vee B} \vee I_1 \quad \frac{\frac{\frac{}{u : A} u \quad \frac{}{w : B} w}{N : C} \quad \frac{}{O : C}}{\mathbf{case inl} M \mathbf{ of inl} u \Rightarrow N \mid \mathbf{inr} w \Rightarrow O : C} \vee E^{u,w}}{\Longrightarrow_R [M/u]N : C}$$

The proof term **case inl** M **of inl** $u \Rightarrow N \mid \mathbf{inr}$ $w \Rightarrow O$ justifying C *true* reduces to the simpler proof term $[M/u]N$ justifying the same C *true* (respectively both programs have type C). The analogy with the logical reduction again works in Harmony.

Falsehood. Since there is no constructor for the empty type there is no reduction rule for falsehood. There is no computation rule and we will not try to evaluate **abort** M .

This concludes the definition of the reduction judgment. Observe that the construction principle for the (computational) reductions is to investigate what happens when any destructor is applied to any corresponding constructor. This will be in direct correspondence with how (logical) reductions for local soundness in Harmony consider what happens when an elimination rule is used in succession on the output of an introduction rule (when reading proofs top to bottom).

Example Computations. As an example we consider a simple program for the composition of two functions. It takes a pair of two functions, one from A to B and one from B to C and returns their composition which maps A directly to C .

$$\text{comp} : ((A \supset B) \wedge (B \supset C)) \supset (A \supset C)$$

We transform the following implicit definition into our notation step-by-step:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{comp } \langle f, g \rangle (w) &= g(f(w)) \\ \text{comp } \langle f, g \rangle &= \text{fn } w \Rightarrow g(f(w)) \\ \text{comp } u &= \text{fn } w \Rightarrow (\mathbf{snd} \ u) ((\mathbf{fst} \ u)(w)) \\ \text{comp} &= \text{fn } u \Rightarrow \text{fn } w \Rightarrow (\mathbf{snd} \ u) ((\mathbf{fst} \ u) \ w) \end{aligned}$$

Constructors	Destructors
$\frac{M : A \quad N : B}{\langle M, N \rangle : A \wedge B} \wedge I$	$\frac{M : A \wedge B}{\mathbf{fst} M : A} \wedge E_1$
	$\frac{M : A \wedge B}{\mathbf{snd} M : B} \wedge E_2$
$\frac{}{\langle \rangle : \top} \top I$	no destructor for \top
$\frac{\frac{\frac{}{u : A} u}{\vdots} M : B}{\mathbf{fn} u \Rightarrow M : A \supset B} \supset I^u$	$\frac{M : A \supset B \quad N : A}{M N : B} \supset E$
$\frac{M : A}{\mathbf{inl} M : A \vee B} \vee I_1$	$\frac{\frac{\frac{\frac{}{u : A} u}{\vdots} M : A \vee B \quad \frac{\frac{\frac{}{w : B} w}{\vdots} N : C}{O : C}}{\mathbf{case} M \mathbf{of} \mathbf{inl} u \Rightarrow N \mid \mathbf{inr} w \Rightarrow O : C} \vee E^{u,w}$
$\frac{N : B}{\mathbf{inr} N : A \vee B} \vee I_2$	
no constructor for \perp	$\frac{M : \perp}{\mathbf{abort} M : C} \perp E$

Figure 1: Proof term assignment for natural deduction

$$\begin{array}{l}
\mathbf{fst} \langle M, N \rangle \Longrightarrow_R M \\
\mathbf{snd} \langle M, N \rangle \Longrightarrow_R N \\
\text{no reduction for } \langle \rangle \\
(\mathbf{fn} \ u \Rightarrow M) N \Longrightarrow_R [N/u]M \\
\mathbf{case} \ \mathbf{inl} \ M \ \mathbf{of} \ \mathbf{inl} \ u \Rightarrow N \mid \mathbf{inr} \ w \Rightarrow O \Longrightarrow_R [M/u]N \\
\mathbf{case} \ \mathbf{inr} \ M \ \mathbf{of} \ \mathbf{inl} \ u \Rightarrow N \mid \mathbf{inr} \ w \Rightarrow O \Longrightarrow_R [M/w]O \\
\text{no reduction for } \mathbf{abort}
\end{array}$$

Figure 2: Proof term reductions

References

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